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DECREASING THE COSTS OF JURISDICTIONAL 
GRIDLOCK: MERGER OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND THE COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Mark Frederick Hoffman• 
Jurisdictional conflict exists between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC), primarily due to the language of the 1974 CFTC 
Act. This Act grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to regulate 
certain financial instruments which, given the increasing complexity 
and "hybrid" nature of such instruments, might simultaneously be 
subject to SEC regulation. This Note first explores the history of the 
two agencies and the statutory language giving rise to the jurisdic-
tional conflict. This Note then examines several instances of juris-
dictional conflict that resulted in extensive costs for the respective 
agencies and the United States' financial markets. Specifically, this 
Note addresses the impact of jurisdictional conflict in terms of 
litigation costs, lost financial innovation, offshore migration of 
financial instruments, and the corresponding decrease of the United 
States' share in the global financial marketplace. This Note further 
examines several other issues posed by interagency conflict and 
suggests that the solution to these real and potential costs is a 
merger of the CFTC into the larger, more experienced SEC. Finally, 
this Note suggests that the current political atmosphere presents the 
most favorabze opportunity to merge the agencies that has existed 
since the creation of the CFTC. While a merger of the two agencies 
may not eliminate all of the inefficiencies of the current system, a 
single regulator could provide a lower-cost alternative to the present, 
anachronistic, dual regulatory system which is faced with problems 
of increasingly complex financial instruments and expanding global 
competition. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was 
established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
of 197 4 (CFTC Act). 1 Since its formation, this federal regulatory 
commission has experienced constant jurisdictional conflict with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A source of 
* Managing Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 
Volume 29, 1995. A.B. 1993, Princeton University; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan 
Law School. I would like to thank Vincent Basulto, Trent Taylor, and Rebecca Rokos 
for their assistance in preparation of this Note. 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) 
(1988)). 
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conflict is the CFTC Act's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" over 
the regulation of certain designated financial instruments2 
which previously were unregulated or which might have been 
subject to SEC regulation. 
Anticipating the potential for overlapping jurisdiction be-
tween the SEC, which is charged with regulating the general 
field of "securities,"3 and the CFTC, which is charged with 
regulating "commodities"4 and "futures,"5 Congress included a 
savings clause in the CFTC Act. This clause provides that, 
"[e]xcept as [otherwise] provided, nothing contained in [the Act] 
shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time con-
ferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission ... or (II) 
restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . from 
carrying out [its] duties and responsibilities .... "6 
This effort to avoid jurisdictional conflict has proven futile 
and has become "a source of uncertainty in the marketplace and 
rivalry between the agencies."7 Indeed, the main problems with 
interagency conflict stem from the uncertain jurisdictional 
authority of each agency.8 In an effort to solve this irreconcil-
able jurisdictional battle and preserve the ability of domestic 
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994). A "security," generally speaking, is "an undivided 
interest in a common venture the value of which is subject to uncertainty." Chicago 
Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1989). For a definition of"security" 
under the Securities Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994); for a definition of 
"security" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see id. § 78c(a)(10). 
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (presenting the legislative findings which necessitate 
formation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). 
5. A "futures" contract is a standardized contract in which the buyer agrees to 
purchase and the seller agrees to sell a specified quantity of a specified commodity at 
a specified future date. Jerry W. Markham & Rita M. Stephanz, The Stock Market 
Crash of 1987: The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 
1997 (1988). Commodity futures are traded only on exchanges designated by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as "contract markets." 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) 
(1994). Commodity futures contracts are generally used for hedging, which allows 
consumers and producers to shield themselves from the risks of adverse price fluctua-
tions. Markham & Stephanz, supra, at 1999. Such contracts are not to be confused with 
forward contracts in which the parties negotiate the quantity, time, and place of 
delivery, as well as the manner of payment and deposit or margin requirements. Jerry 
W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange Act: 
A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 7. 
6. 7 u.s.c. § 2 (1994). 
7. Egon Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation ofCFTC-
SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1978). 
8. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of 
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LA w. 44 7, 461 
(1995). 
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financial markets to compete globally, this Note supports a 
proposal to merge the CFTC into the more experienced SEC. 
This proposal recognizes that altering statutory language has 
proven fruitless in curing the jurisdictional battles and that 
attempts at cooperation by the heads of the two agencies have 
proven only temporarily successful. Delegating plenary authori-
ty to the SEC through a CFTC-SEC merger, although not the 
only solution to the problems posed by jurisdictional conflict, 
would significantly increase the United States' ability to com-
pete for capital, reduce the crippling effect of jurisdictional 
dispute on financial innovation, and limit the need for judicial 
resolution of complex financial matters. 
Although many similar proposals for restructuring American 
financial markets have been raised since the dawn of the CFTC 
more than twenty years ago,9 congressional oversight commit-
tees have tended to bury the issues once the enthusiasm has 
subsided and other executive or legislative matters divert at-
tention from financial restructuring issues.10 With the arrival 
of a new Republican majority, however, the possibility of a 
CFTC-SEC merger is very much alive. 11 
9. For a discussion of proposals for consolidation of the agencies, see CHICAGO MER-
CANTILE ExcHANGE, MoDEL FOR FEDERAL F'INANCW.. 'REGULATION 2-15 (1993) [hereinafter CME 
PROPOSAL] and PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANlSMS, 1988 REPORT 59--68 
[hereinafter BRADY REPORT]. The Brady Report, so called because it analyzed various 
market factors contributing to the 1987 stock market crash and recommended that a 
single regulatory agency, possibly the Federal Reserve, coordinate critical regulatory 
issues which have an impact across the related market segments. BRADY REPORT, supra, 
at 69. The CME Proposal recommends consolidating numerous federal agencies which 
currently possess financial regulatory authority into a single cabinet-level department. 
CME PROPOSAL, supra, at 2-4. Ultimately, however, the CME Proposal is aimed at 
protecting the interests of futures markets, because it recommends that trading in all 
"standardized offset instruments (whether overlying financial assets or obligations, 
foreign exchange, or agricultural or mineral commodities)" be regulated by a "Division 
of Risk-Shifting Markets," which would closely resemble the CFTC. Id. at 9. The CME 
Proposal also places responsibility for regulating all trading in security options in a 
"Division of Investment Securities Markets," id. at 8-9, thereby removing jurisdiction 
over security options from the SEC. For a more complete analysis of the CME Proposal, 
see Coffee, supra note 8, at 451-53. 
10. Id. at 44 7-48; see also 5 Loms Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURlTlES REGULATION 
2497 n.61 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that "it is highly unlikely that any reasoned congressio-
nal review will occur as long as different congressional committees have oversight 
responsibilities"). 
11. In terms of recognizing the need to merge the financial regulators under a 
single agency, perhaps the most significant, recent political event is the rise of Dan 
Glickman (a Kansas Democrat and former Member of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives) to the position of Secretary of Agriculture. Glickman has long been a strong 
advocate for a CFTC-SEC merger. With a Republican majority now in Congress, the 
theory behind a merger may well be put into practice. For further discussion of recent 
political changes, see infra Part IIl.B. 
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Although there are numerous theoretical and practical rea-
sons favoring a merger of the two regulatory agencies, this Note 
will focus particular attention on: (1) the problem of determin-
ing which agency will regulate new financial instruments12 
which frequently defy traditional classifications as "securities" 
or "futures"; (2) the loss of the ability of American financial 
markets to compete globally because of overlapping regulatory 
jurisdiction; and (3) the need to curb inefficient litigation which 
forces judges, who are less experienced in complex financial 
issues than either the SEC or the CFTC, to classify financial 
instruments as falling under the jurisdiction of one of the two 
agencies.13 Eradication of inter-jurisdictional conflicts, which is 
critical to domestic markets, is even more important on the 
international scene where "it is important to have one regula-
tory agency speak for [the United States] on regulatory mat-
ters."14 
Part I of this Note explores the history of the CFTC and the 
SEC and the source of the ongoing jurisdictional battle, briefly 
explaining the financial instruments involved that contribute to 
the dispute. Part II examines the evolution of numerous dis-
putes between the agencies concerning regulatory authority 
over various financial instruments and presents three examples 
of judicial intervention that attempt to resolve such disputes. 
Finally, Part III asserts that the jurisdictional disputes result 
in numerous practical and theoretical problems which impede 
financial innovation and global competition. This Note con-
cludes that the current system of financial regulation of the 
securities and futures markets is untenable in a world of 
increasingly complex financial instruments and global competi-
tion. This Note recommends that the CFTC merge into the SEC 
to ameliorate the detrimental impact of the ongoing CFTC-SEC 
jurisdictional overlap. 
12. 8e£ NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, AN 0vERvIEw OF PRooRAM 'l'RAINING AND !'IS IMPACT ON 
CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES 19 (1987). The rapid growth of financial instruments 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s already has spawned extensive, wasteful litigation and 
inhibited innovation of such instruments. See infra Part II. No amount of tampering 
with the statutory language is likely to solve such definitional problems, since the two 
agencies most likely will continue to fight over the right to regulate new instruments. 
13. In addition to ameliorating these major issues, a merger of the agencies could 
result in numerous other efficiencies, such as a "unified system for settlement and 
clearance of securities, options, and stock index futures transactions." Coffee, supra note 
8, at 479. For a discussion of other benefits which would result from a CFTC-SEC 
merger, including improved clearing and credit mechanisms and margin requirements, 
see BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at 59. 
14. KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15. 
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT 
A. Brief History of the SEC and the CFTC 
1. Securities and Exchange Commission-The SEC has a 
long history in the regulation of American financial markets. 
The SEC was established following the stock market crash of 
1929 and the ensuing congressional calls for tighter regulation 
over financial markets.15 Numerous congressional investigations 
followed the 1929 Crash, eventually identifying at least two 
causal factors in the Crash that needed tighter regulation: 
inadequate stock margin requirements and option abuses. 16 
Congress found these factors to be "at the bottom of most 
manipulative [stock] operations .... "17 These factors led to pas-
sage of the Securities Act of 193318 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 193419 in order to give the SEC authority to regulate 
securities for the protection of the public. 
2. Commodity Exchange Act-Although the abuses of stock 
margins and options were the primary cause of the 1929 Crash, 
commodity options also were the object of numerous abuses.20 
Speculation on commodities and options were blamed for the 
collapse of the wheat market during the Great Depression.21 In 
response to President Franklin Roosevelt's demand for greater 
regulation of commodity exchanges, Congress passed the 
15. ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 23 (1992); see 
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND TIIE FuTuRE OF FINANCE 220-21 (1985) (noting that between 
1920 and 1929, prior to the establishment of the SEC, "incomplete, careless or false 
representations" had cost investors $25 billion). 
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934). A "margin" is 
an amount deposited up front which differs somewhat for a security and a futures 
contract. Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two 
Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 786 (1983). A "futures 
margin" is a deposit which guarantees the performance of both parties to a futures 
transaction, while a "securities margin" is the lowest percentage of the purchase price 
by which a purchaser can take possession of a security. Id. 
17. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 747 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1934); S. REP. 
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934)). 
18. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 
15 u.s.c. § 77 (1994)). 
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994)). 
20. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 759. 
21. Id. 
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Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)22 in 1936, which banned trad-
ing of any options in the agricultural commodities then regulat-
ed by the CEA. 23 The stated purpose of the CEA was to "insure 
fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchange, 
and to provide some measure of control .... "24 The CEA and 
the commodities markets existed in relative peace until the 
1970s, when commodity prices soared and scandals rocked the 
markets.25 
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission--,-Congress 
created the CFTC largely in response to regulatory gaps in the 
CEA that left certain transactions unregulated. 26 Although they 
ultimately lost millions, several market participants were able 
to manipulate the gaps to their temporary advantage during 
the early 1970s.27 The most significant scandal of this period 
was the Goldstein-Samuelson options abuses of 1972.28 
Goldstein, a twenty-six-year-old trader, manipulated a loophole 
in the CEA that did not expressly prohibit the trading of 
options on certain commodities such as coffee, silver, and plati-
num.29 Starting with only $800 in 1971, Goldstein's firm estab-
lished offices worldwide and earned forty-five million dollars in 
income by the end of 1972. 30 Disaster quickly followed, however, 
22. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994)). 
23. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760. The CEA stated that [i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person to offer to "enter into, or confirm the execution of, any transac-
tions involving any commodity ... if such transaction is, is of the character of, or is 
commonly known to the trade as a 'privilege', 'indemnity', 'bid', 'offer', 'put', 'call', 
'advance guaranty', or 'decline guaranty' .... " Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 
§ 6c(b), 49 Stat. 1491, 1494. This ban lasted for more than thirty years. Markham & 
Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760. Commodities options now may be traded pursuant to 7 
U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1994). 
24. U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE, AMEND GRAIN FuTuREs ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1637, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). 
25. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2005--06; see also Markham & 
Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760-61 (discussing a loophole in the CEA, discovered in the 
early 1970s, that resulted in large price increases and million dollar losses). 
26. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760, 762-63. 
27. See id. at 760-63. 
28. See id. at 760-61; see also SEC v. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'I 93,800 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1973); In re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Samuel 
Brokerage, Inc. [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 71,095 (Okla. 
Dep't of Securities Feb. 23, 1973). 
29. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 761. In addition to coffee, silver, and 
platinum, the CEA did not regulate options on sugar, foreign currencies, cocoa, copper, 
lumber, mercury, palladium, plywood, propane gas, or silver coins. Philip F. Johnson, 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 
V AND. L. REV. 1, 3 n. 71 (1976). 
30. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760. 
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as Goldstein was selling naked options31 and was unable to 
cover his positions as prices increased. By 1973, he had left 
behind $85 million in unpaid options, and many other firms 
who had followed his lead similarly had lost millions of dollars 
of investors' money.32 
Following this debacle, Congress enacted the CFTC Act in 
1974, amending the CEA to include "all other goods and articles 
... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."33 Thus, 
in addition to the "regulated commodities" under the CEA, 
Congress also sought to regulate previously unregulated com-
modities and markets on which they were traded. 34 
B. Statutory Language and Jurisdictional Confiict 
The CFTC Act35 gave birth to an agency with broad regula-
tory oversight of commodity futures. 36 The CFTC is subject to 
a "sunset provision" that requires congressional reauthorization 
of the agency every two years.37 The most controversial aspect 
of the CFTC is the congressional grant of "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" over futures regulation, thereby preempting the field. 38 
31. "Naked options are options not backed by any physical commodity or other 
means to cover the obligation. When the owner of a naked option has to cover the 
contract, he must enter the market to purchase the commodity in question." Markham 
& Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2006 n.71. 
32. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 761. 
33. Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 404a, 106 Stat. 3625 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1994)). 
34. Guttman, supra note 7, at 24. For a list of previously unregulated commodities 
covered by the CFTC Act, see supra note 29. 
35. 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1994). 
36. Coffee, supra note 8, at 461 (noting that "[i)n creating the CFTC in 1974, 
Congress seemed to preempt the field of commodity futures regulation by conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction on the CFTC"). 
37. 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (Supp. IV 1992). Prior to 1986, the reauthorization period was 
four years, but between 1986 and 1992, the period was reduced to three years. Compare 
7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1976) with id. § 16(d) (1988). 
38. Specifically, 7 U.S.C. § 2 provides: 
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... with respect to accounts, 
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly 
known to the trade as an "option" "privilege" "indemnity" "bid" "offer" "put" 
"call", "advance guar~ty", or "de~line guar~ty"), and tr~actions in~olving 
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a 
contract market ... or any other board of trade, exchange, or market .... 
7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (Supp. V 1993). 
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The CFTC Act also contains an SEC savings clause that has 
further exacerbated the jurisdictional dispute between the SEC 
and the CFTC by protecting and preserving SEC authority.39 
Despite the "savings" language, the distinct jurisdictional 
boundaries of the CFTC and the SEC are very unclear. 40 The 
only clear language of the CFTC Act is the so-called "Treasury 
Amendment,"41 which "preclude[s] the CFTC from asserting 
jurisdiction over the cash market in the ... 'specified financial 
instruments ... which generally are [traded] between banks 
and other sophisticated institutional participants' "42 from both 
The CFTC asserts its exclusive jurisdiction through§ 5(g) of the CEA, which permits 
the CFTC to "designate any board of trade as a 'contract market'. .. ." 7 U.S.C. § 7 
(1994). The CFTC thus has the power to designate a contract market, "thereby 
asserting exclusive jurisdiction, that has led to CFTC-SEC tensions." Guttman, supra 
note 7, at 7. 
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 
F.2d 1137, 1145 (7th Cir.) (noting Congress' awkward attempt to divide jurisdiction 
between the CFTC and the SEC with the proviso clauses in § 2), vacated as moot, 459 
U.S. 1026 (1982). 
40. 120 CONG. REC. 34, 736 (1974) [hereinafter Poage Statement] (statement of Rep. 
Poage). Even prior to the passage of the CFTC Act, members of Congress themselves 
anticipated the possibility of jurisdictional overlap given the unclear and broad 
language of the Act: 
I further understand . . . that the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
jurisdiction over other types of securities, including investment contracts, and that 
the term investment contract includes a broad category of arrangements and 
contracts relating to investments. In this area, there may be some apparent overlap 
between the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
intended jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over trading 
in futures contracts relating ... to tangible commodities. It was not intended that 
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to 
investment contracts be superseded, except to the extent that jurisdiction is 
granted to the CFTC with respect to contracts for future delivery or options 
relating, or purporting to relate, to tangible commodities .... [T]he act ... is not 
intended to create any regulatory gaps. 
Id. at 34,737 (emphasis added). It seems that Congress did not, in 1974, anticipate the 
tremendous growth in the market for financial derivative and hybrid products which 
later would develop and which now are the source of the most serious jurisdictional 
disputes. See id. 
41. The "Treasury Amendment" reads: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to 
transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of 
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgag-
es and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale 
thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade. 
7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. V 1993). 
42. Guttman, supra note 7, at 18 (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
49-50 (1974)). 
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SEC and CFTC regulation. This Amendment prevents dual 
regulation of such instruments by the CFTC and bank regulato-
ry agencies.43 
As a result of the CFTC's grant of exclusive jurisdiction, a 
grant which does not exemplify legislative clarity,44 the juris-
dictional conflict first alluded to in congressional hearings has 
come to fruition.45 As former SEC Chairman Roderick Hills first 
noted in 1975, "it is relatively easy to suggest that the most 
basic examples of what is unambiguously a security, such as a 
share of GM or AT&T, are literally within the definition of a 
'commodity' .... "46 Another former SEC Chairman, Harold M. 
Williams, recognized the ramifications of the broad language 
included in the CEA, stating that "[t]he definition of the term 
commodity ... as used in the legislation, w[as] broad-so broad, 
in fact, that traditional securities and traditional securities 
transactions could be construed as falling within the terms of 
the statute."47 
While the jurisdictional language has caused problems in the 
past and will continue to do so, future problems posed by new 
financial instruments, ranging from innovative derivative in-
struments48 to other hybrid instruments,49 cannot be solved by 
43. See COMMODITY Fl.mJREs TRADING COMM'N, OTC DERlvATIVE MARKETs AND THEIR 
REGULATION 15 (1993). 
44. Guttman, supra note 7, at 27. 
45. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 460-66 (chronicling the struggles for jurisdiction 
between the CFTC and the SEC from 1979 to the present); infra Part II.B-D (discuss-
ing specific instances of jurisdictional disputes). 
46. Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC Chairman William T. 
Bagley (1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'f 20,117 (Nov. 13, 
1975). 
4 7. Extend Comm00ity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the Subcomm. 
on Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
185 (1978) [hereinafter Williams Statement] (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chair-
man, SEC). 
48. "A 'derivative' is a contract that either allows or obligates one of the parties ... 
to buy or sell an asset." Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of 
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory lncrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 
1457, 1464-65 (1993). Its value "derives from the value of the 'underlying [asset],' be it 
a specific stock, commodity, stock index, interest rate, or exchange rate." Id. 
49. A "hybrid" is a fairly recent financial development that cannot be classified as 
either a futures or an options contract as it combines elements of both. RICHARD W. 
JENNINGS ET AL., 8EcuRmEs REGULATION 25 (7th ed. 1992). lfan instrument is a commodi-
ties future or option contract, it is subject to CFTC jurisdiction; if it is categorized as 
a security, it is subject to SEC jurisdiction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i)-(ii) (1994). Such classifi-
cation problems force courts to determine, in the words of one Seventh Circuit judge, 
"whether tetrahedrons belong in square or round holes." Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. 
SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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current regulatory framework. which determines jurisdiction 
primarily on the basis of confusing statutory classifications. 50 
Further supporting the merger argument is the fact that, 
since the stock market crash of 1987,51 market professionals 
and investors have recognized that the markets for stocks, 
futures, and options are inextricably linked and thus constitute 
a single market.52 Numerous factors link the various markets 
together, including the increasing use of portfolio insurance53 
and program trading,54 both of which were implicated in the 
1987 Crash and both of which link the securities and futures 
markets by attempting to limit losses in one market through 
activity in the other.55 
The securities and futures markets also are considered to con-
stitute a single market because of the nature of the instruments 
traded there. As former SEC Chairman Harold Williams has 
noted, futures on financial securities are directly comparable to 
options on securities, because "both [are] devices for risk man-
agement in relation to price fluctuations in the underlying 
securities. "56 Recognizing the uniformity of the securities and 
50. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 461. 
51. Between October 13 and October 19, 1987, the New York Stock Exchange 
suffered its worst decline since the Great Depression, losing more than one trillion 
dollars in value. Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 1993. For a more detailed 
examination of the causes and impact of the 1987 Crash on financial regulatory policy 
from the viewpoints of the various financial markets, see CHICAGO BD. OF TRADE, 
REsl'oNSE TO THE .I'RFsIDENTIAL TASK FoRCE ON MAfuOO' MEclIANJsMs (1987); CME, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CmCAGO MERCANTILE Ex-
CHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (1987); DIVISON OF 
EcoNOMIC .ANALYSlS & DIVISION OF TRADING AND MAfuOO's, CFTC, FINAL REPORT ON ST0cK 
INDEX FuTuREs AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1988); DIVISION OF 
MARKET REGULATION, SEC, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988); GoVERNMENT 
AccoUNI'ING OmCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRELIMINARY 0BsERvATIONS ON THE OcroBER 1987 
CRASH, GGD-88-38 (1988); NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., AN 
OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CUR.RENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987). 
52. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at vi; Jeffrey Taylor, Support Grows for SEC, 
CFTC Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at Cl, Cl6. 
53. "Portfolio insurance," or "dynamic hedging," as it is sometimes called, is a 
"computer-driven strategy of index-futures sales in a declining market and purchases 
in a rising market." Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2000 n.31. Essentially, the 
purchase of index futures offsets the losses suffered in a declining market, thereby 
creating a floor on such losses. Id. at 1999-2000. For a discussion of portfolio insurance, 
see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2650-52. 
54. "Program trading" generally refers to trading systems, including portfolio 
insurance, which are computer-driven. Los~ & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2650-52. 
55. Id. For further discussion on the causes behind the 1987 Crash and proposed 
market responses, see id. at 2491-2505. 
56. Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 193. Williams noted further that 
"securities futures and securities options raise similar policy concerns from the 
perspective of their impact on the American economy. Neither securities futures nor 
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futures markets, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mecha-
nisms, chaired by Nicholas F. Brady, concluded that a single 
market regulator should oversee American financial markets 
because the "guiding objective should be to enhance the inte-
grity and competitiveness of U.S. financial markets."57 Similari-
ties between the two markets, combined with the need to avoid 
the intermarket disjunction which precipitated the 1987 Crash, 
suggest the need to merge the SEC and CFTC, or to at least 
unify certain mechanisms across both sets of markets. 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP AND 
HISTORY OF SEC-CFTC JURISDICTIONAL BATTLES 
A. Consequences of Jurisdictional Overlap 
The existing system of confused, overlapping regulation 
between the SEC and the CFTC has resulted in significant 
costs to domestic financial markets. The overlap has unneces-
sarily increased administrative and transaction costs, as well as 
stifled financial innovation in the United States and forced such 
innovation overseas. 58 Interagency efforts at cooperation have 
failed, leaving a merger of the agencies as the most logical 
means of coordinating regulatory policy and protecting domestic 
markets from losing more of the global market share. 
Overlapping jurisdiction and the conflicts resulting from 
obscure jurisdictional lines have increased the administrative 
costs of regulating the markets. 59 For instance, the lack of 
options on securities lead directly to new capital formation." Id. at 193-94. "At the most 
basic level, the prices of both futures on securities and options on securities are 
primarily dependent on the same factor-the price of the underlying security." Id. at 
194-95. 
57. BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at vi. 
58. SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Issues: Hearings on H.R. 4477 Before the House 
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1991) [hereinafter Merger Hearings]. Agriculture 
Secretary Dan Glickman, then Representative Glickman (D-KS), stated at the hearings 
that "(t]he competition should not be between the agencies, it is between us and Japan, 
us and Europe, and us and the rest of the world." Id. at 39. See also Merton H. Miller 
& Christopher L. Culp, Why the CFTC is an Anachronism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, 
at Al 7 ("Congress should move quickly to rethink the ... [CFTC's] mandate before the 
costs and uncertainties generated by that obsolete agency drive even more of the 
financial services industry abroad."). 
59. See Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 245-47. 
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coordination across the securities and futures markets has led 
to surveillance and enforcement difficulties.Go As a result, one 
market may be manipulated to benefit a position held in the 
other market, leading former SEC Chairman Williams to note 
that "[surveillance and enforcement] can only be effective if 
both markets are regulated by the same agency."G1 
Dual and undefined regulatory authority also increases costs 
through duplicative efforts in the two agencies.G2 Besides the 
absence of a single regulator with an overview of the inter-
market positions of market participants,G3 there also is no single 
clearing corporation.G4 Such a void can impede lenders' assess-
ment of risk exposure and "affectD the willingness of lenders to 
finance market participants. "G5 Margins are not coordinated 
across securities and futures markets and, as noted by reports 
analyzing the 1987 Crash, should be rationalized across all 
markets.GG 
A single market regulator would benefit from the economies 
of scale generated through a unified system of settlement, 
clearance, and other standardized rules.G7 The willingness of 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and other market 
administrators to propose alternative, consolidated, regulatory 
structures suggests that at least some of these various factors 
are increasing the markets' costs and decreasing their global 
market share.Gs To the extent that a single agency benefits 
from economies of scale and can avoid such overlapping juris-
dictional confusion and related costs, a merger of the agencies 
would effectively reduce such administrative and surveillance 
costs. 
Interagency battles over which agency will regulate a new 
financial instrument stifle financial innovation, increase costs, 
and provide advantages to overseas markets.G9 Interagency 
60. See Richard Breeden, Federal Regulation. of Fin.an.cial Services: Time for a 
Change, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 316, 317-19 (1983). 
61. Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 196; see also Breeden, supra note 60, at 
318 (arguing that intermatket manipulation requires coordinated surveillance and 
enforcement). 
· 62. CME PROPOSAL, supra note 9, at 3. 




67. Coffee, supra note 8, at 479. 
68. See id. at 451-52. 
69. Id. at 465; see also in.fra Part 11.B-D (discussing several jurisdictional battles 
and providing examples of financial instruments that, due to jurisdictional fighting, 
have moved overseas). 
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disputes over which agency should regulate a new instrument 
frequently lengthen the normal delay in gaining regulato:ry 
approval for the instrument.70 Assuming that the instrument is 
permitted to reach financial markets at all, such time delays 
chill financial innovation and impede new product develop-
ment. 71 The victorious agency is left with the dubious honor of 
winning the jurisdictional battle by stifling the creation of new 
financial products. 72 
When the interagency jurisdictional battles result in lost 
innovation, the stifled financial instruments do not disappear 
but merely move overseas. Between 1986 and 1991, the domes-
tic share of the world's futures trading fell from eighty percent 
to less than fifty percent.73 This significant increase in interna-
tional competition and corresponding loss in the United States' 
share of the world market is largely the fault of U.S. regulators 
and regulatory conflicts.74 For example, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange successfully began trading an "index participation 
product"75 during the same period in which the two agencies 
70. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 465; Michael Peltz, Days of Futures Past?, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, June 1994, at 183-84. 
71. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 464-66, 481. 
72. See id. at 481. 
73. Peltz, supra note 70, at 183. The French, German, and English markets were 
up between 65% and 115% during the same period that American exchanges, specifical-
ly the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOT) and the CME were up only 39% and 
36%, respectively. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 8, at 481 (noting the significant 
increase in foreign markets, particularly in Asia, Canada, and Europe, resulting in the 
United States having a minority share in the global market). 
Some of the increase in market shares by foreign markets can be attributed to an 
increase in American investing abroad. In 1992, U.S. investors owned $190 billion in 
foreign equities, as compared to $19 billion in 1982. Edward F. Green et al., Hegemony 
or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 
Bus. LAW. 413, 413-14: (1995). For a discussion of the globalization of the financial 
marketplace and the significant inroads that foreign markets are making in the global 
marketplace, see Joseph A Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities 
Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349 
(1990). 
74. See Peltz, supra note 70, at 185; see also CME PROPOSAL, supra note 9, at 1 
(stating that the existing regulatory structure has resisted changes in financial 
markets due to international competition and thus has undermined its own effec-
tiveness). 
75. An "index participation" is a contract of indefinite duration "based on the value 
of a basket (index) of securities." Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 
(7th Cir. 1989). "The seller of an [index participation] promises to pay the buyer the 
value of the index as measured on a [certain) 'cash-out day'." Id. The buyer pays for the 
participation contract in cash and may purchase on margin at the same rate as the 
Federal Reserve sets for stocks, currently 50%. Id. at 540. See also Coffee, supra note 
8, at 462 (discussing the "murky territory" represented by index participations, which 
have qualities similar to both options and futures on indexes). 
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prevented introduction of the product on domestic exchanges 
through fighting over the right to regulate the instruments.76 
If there is any value in regulatory competition, "the signifi-
cance of the benefits it promises are being eclipsed by the 
rapid globalization of all major financial markets."77 Given the 
increased costs and decreased innovation produced by the 
jurisdictional overlap between the CFTC and the SEC, it may 
be easier for a single, consolidated agency to address pressing 
global issues than it would be for two agencies.78 The homoge-
neity of financial markets and the need for a single regulatory 
authority have been apparent since the 1987 Crash. Thus, 
Congress should seize the politically favorable window of op-
portunity presented by the current Republican majority in 
Congress to enact merger legislation.79 
B. Government National Mortgage 
Association Disputes 
The first major battle between the SEC and the CFTC relat-
ing to overlapping jurisdiction occurred in 1975, less than one 
year after the CFTC's creation. The Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) had applied to the CFTC for designation as a contract 
market for trading futures contracts on Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) certificates.80 In September 1975, 
the CFTC granted the CBOT's request, and trading on GNMA 
76. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 465-66; see also infra Part 11.D (discussing the 
dispute between the agencies over the issue of regulation of index participations). 
Another battle between the two agencies, stemming from regulation of futures on 
individual stocks, similarly moved trade in such futures to foreign markets. Coffee, 
supra note 8, at 466; see also Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 257 (SEC Chairman 
Breeden noting the time and cost savings for Japanese, German, French, and British 
issuers who are subject only to a single regulatory authority). 
Another harmful consequence of the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional dispute is the creation 
of new products introduced for the purpose of avoiding regulatory constraints. Breeden, 
supra note 60, at 316. 
77. Coffee, supra note 8, at 457. 
78. See id. at 4 79-80; see also Ivy Schmerken, Merging the Regulators, WALL ST. & 
TECH., Mar. 1993, at 29. Schmerken notes that acting with a single voice on interna-
tional matters fosters international competitiveness and our ability to act efficiently in 
the global market. Id. at 30-34. 
79. For a discussion of the current favorable political environment, see infra Part 
IIl.B. 
80. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 773. 
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futures began in October 1975.81 The SEC formally objected to 
the CFTC's action, asserting that "GNMA certificates and 
Treasury bills were securities and thus should be subject 
exclusively to SEC jurisdiction" and that contracts for future 
delivery of such securities were still securities.82 The SEC lost 
this first battle, and the CFTC granted the CBOT permission 
and issued a memorandum describing the CFTC's justification 
for their assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over GNMA fu-
tures.83 In response, SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills sent a 
letter to the CFTC detailing fourteen areas of CFTC jurisdiction 
that the SEC felt were unresolved. 84 
Although the SEC lost this battle, it retaliated three years 
later in 1978 by granting an application by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE) to trade options on GNMA certifi-
cates, thereby authorizing the CBOE to "trade a derivative 
instrument largely paralleling the futures contract on GNMA 
certificates already traded on the CBOT."85 The CBOT objected 
to this action, arguing in part that the GNMA option closely 
paralleled a futures contract and that the SEC was without 
authorization to permit trading of GNMA options. 86 The CBOT 
sued the SEC and won an injunction pending trial in the 
Seventh Circuit.87 This injunction remained in place until the 
81. Id. 
82. Coffee, supra note 8, at 461. 
83. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 773-74. 
84. Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC Chairman William T. 
Bagley (1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), 'I 20,117 (Nov. 13, 
1975). Among the fourteen questions posed were those regarding the differences 
between securities options contracts. and futures contracts on securities, rights of 
private action under the SEC and CFTC statutes, enforcement jurisdiction, disclosure 
and licensing requirements, delivery problems, and the relationship between futures 
and cash markets in securities. Id. Hills further stated: 
We have previously advised [the CFTC] of our view that GNMA certificates and 
Treasury Bills are securities, as that term is defined in the federal securities laws. 
We also believe it to be quite clear that contracts for future delivery of those 
securities are also 'securities.' ... 
We therefore have a situation where two distinct statutory and regulatory 
schemes appear applicable, in a manner not yet precisely determined, to a variety 
of transactions and relationships involving securities. 
Id. This problem still has not been resolved. 
85. Coffee, supra note 8, at 461-62. 
86. Id. 
87. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text (discussing Board of Trade v. 
SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982)). 
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Shad/Johnson Accord in 1982 resolved the interagency dispute 
regarding GNMA options trading. 88 
In 1978, the CFTC survived a second series of reauth-
orization hearings, despite vocal SEC opposition to reauth-
orization. The SEC took the opportunity tq place the ongoing 
SEC-CFTC jurisdictional dispute before Congress, asking it to 
give the SEC full jurisdiction over all derivative products,89 
whether options or futures.90 SEC Chairman Williams capital-
ized on the hearings by expressing the SEC's position regarding 
CFTC jurisdiction over GNMA certificates and the more sub-
stantive problems regarding the disputes arising from the 
CFTC's claim of exclusive jurisdiction.91 
Williams also brought to the attention of Congress another 
evolving jurisdictional problem that concerned the Kansas City 
Board of Trade's (KCBT) petition to the CFTC to trade a fu-
tures contract on a 500 Composite Stock Index based upon the 
Standard & Poor's Index.92 The KCBT's petition ultimately 
88. See infra Part 11.C (discussing the Accord and resolution of the GNMA options 
issue). 
89. For a definition of a derivative instrument, see supra note 48. 
90. Coffee, supra note 8, at 461. 
91. Williams, in lengthy and assertive testimony, recommended that the "regulato-
ry and enforcement authority for futures trading on securities and trading in the 
underlying securities should be vertically integrated in one agency." Williams State· 
ment, supra note 47, at 183. Williams further commented on the CFTC's assertion of 
exclusive jurisdiction over trading of GNMA futures, stating: 
[Exclusive jurisdiction] ignores the close connection between the futures market 
for these debt securities and the markets for the underlying debt securities. Since 
the [SEC] has a significant role in regulating the markets for these underlying 
debt securities, there is no reason to maintain a legal scheme in which the 
CFTC's jurisdiction serves only to hamper the operation of an integrated regula-
tory approach to these important markets. 
Id. at 197. Even in 1978, Williams recognized the close connection between the 
securities and futures markets, implying that they are essentially a single market. Id. 
at 199. 
92. Guttman, supra note 7, at 21. The KCBT originally intended to use the Dow 
Jones Industrial Stock Average (DJISA) as its stock index, but Dow Jones refused to 
allow the KCBT to use its name. Jerry Knight, KC Board of Trade Proposes Dealing 
Futures on Standard & Poor's Average, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1978, at Dl. The KCBT 
essentially was proposing to trade a futures contract on a stock index. See Williams 
Statement, supra note 47, at 188. Williams' concern was less focused on this particular 
KCBT proposal than on the potential ramifications of allowing stock index futures to 
be traded: 
[W]e are concerned that the CFTC might grant [the KCBT application], or, in any 
event, might later decide to permit trading of a futures contract on traditional 
equity securities, such as GM or AT&T common stock ... that the CFTC's staff 
has recognized ... may not come within the literal definition of 'commodity' .... 
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resulted in a four-year moratorium on trading of stock index 
futures, during which time the agencies struggled to resolve 
their differences.93 
In the end, the House of Representatives voted to maintain 
the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over futures contract trading, 
refusing the SEC's request that it be granted regulatory author-
ity over derivative products.94 Congress did enact a provision, 
however, requiring that the CFTC maintain communications 
with the SEC, the Treasury Department, and the Federal 
Reserve regarding areas of overlapping jurisdiction and consider 
the views of the latter two agencies when approving applica-
tions for trading in futures on government securities.95 Congress 
did place some new requirements on the CFTC regarding 
communication with other agencies during the 1978 reauth-
orization hearings, but it did not resolve the ongoing GNMA 
conflict. 
In Board of Trade v. SEC,96 the Seventh Circuit addressed 
the CBOE's 1978 application to the SEC for permission to 
trade options on GNMA certificates.97 This case presents a 
prime example of the significant costs accompanying the SEC-
CFTC jurisdictional dispute. After the CBOE's application in 
1978, the CBOT, which had in 1975 won the right to trade 
futures contracts on GNMA certificates, won an injunction 
preventing the SEC from authorizing the CBOE's trading on 
Id. For further discussion of the KCBT proposal, see Kansas City Bomber?, ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 28, 1978, at 118; Aimee L. Mamer, There May Be a Future for Stock-Index 
Futures, FORTUNE, Mar. 26, 1979, at 107. For further discussion of the function of stock 
index futures, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2635-39. 
93. KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15. The interagency dispute regarding the 
trading and regulation of stock-index futures ultimately was resolved in the 
Shad/Johnson Accord. See infra Part 11.C (discussing the interagency jurisdictional 
agreement regarding stock index futures). 
94. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 775-76. 
95. The United States Code provides: 
The [CFTC] shall maintain communications with the Department of the Treasury, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission for the purpose of keeping such agencies fully informed of 
Commission activities that relate to the responsibilities of those agencies, for the 
purpose of seeking the views of those agencies on such activities, and for consider-
ing the relationships between the volume and nature of investment and trading 
in contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and in securities and 
financial instruments under the jurisdiction of such agencies. 
7 U.S.C. § 4a(g)(2}(i) (1994). 
96. 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). 
97. Id. at 1138; see also Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 776. 
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GNMA options.98 Thus, for four years, until 1982, when this 
case was finally decided, the jurisdictional battle prevented the 
trading of GNMA options. The dispute forced the Seventh 
Circuit judges to resolve a case "which present[ed] the complex-
ity of [a] 'Gordian Knot' and which, once having been submit-
ted, must be resolved by the court."99 This case highlights the 
inadequacy of a judicial solution to complex financial questions 
which should be addressed by congressional action. 
The issue before the court was whether the SEC has auth-
ority to regulate options trading in GNMAs, given that GNMAs 
are both "commodities" and "securities."100 The CBOE argued 
that GNMA options fall within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdic-
tion over commodity options, 101 while the SEC argued that the 
trading of options on securities is not covered under the CEA 
and thus is not within the jurisdiction of the CFTC.102 The 
court decided the case despite Congress' ongoing deliberation of 
98. Coffee, supra note 8, at 461-62. 
99. Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1168 (Campbell, J., concurring). Judge Campbell 
further scolded the two agencies for their inability to maintain communications as they 
are statutorily required fu do and for forcing the judiciary to resolve an enormously 
complex issue: 
Id. 
Not only are we expected to become expert in securities and commodities, master 
a complex mass ofregulatory legislation and historical development, but we must 
also discern Congressional intent and apply it to a market of financial instru-
ments which did not exist at the time the relevant legislation was enacted. The 
difficulty of this task would not disturb me if I did not perceive our role in this 
matter as inappropriate .... The fact that Chief Judge Cummings and Judge 
Cudahy [dissenting) were able to fashion coherent and expert solutions to the 
problem is not due to the suitability of the task to judicial resolution, but to the 
individual brilliance and dedication of those men. 
100. Id. at 1138. The court noted the similarity of the GNMA options to futures 
contracts, stating that with GNMA options, like futures, the option holder may "offset" 
one position by purchasing or selling an equal and opposite position. Id. at 1139. 
101. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (providing that "[t)he [CFTCJ shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction ... with respect to accounts [and) agreements (including any transaction 
which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option' ... )") 
with id. § 6c(b) (providing that "[n)o person shall offer to enter into, enter into or 
confirm the execution of, any transaction ... which is of the character of, or is com-
monly known to the trade as, an 'option' "). 
102. 677 F.2d at 1142. "The dispute arises primarily because GNMA's are both 
'securities' under [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), and 
'commodities' under CEA§ 2(a)(l), 7 U.S.C. § 2." Id. Recall that Congress ratified the 
ban on options trading when it created the CFTC in 1975, stipulating that the ban will 
remain until the CFTC proposes to lift it. Id. at 1143. Thus, the CFTC argued, and the 
court agreed, that "[t)he CFTC has not lifted the ban on GNMA options trading and 
therefore the CBOE cannot trade GNMA options." Id. at 1144 (footnote omitted). 
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the Accord. The court held that the CFTC has jurisdiction over 
GNMA options103 because GNMA options are not securities, 
and thus are not subject to SEC regulation.104 The dissenting 
opinion sharply criticized the majority's holding.105 This case, 
however, later was rendered moot by Congress' adoption of the 
Accord.106 
C. Shad/Johnson Accord of 1982 and 
the 1984 Compromise 
In the midst of the debate over which agency ultimately 
would regulate options on GNMA certificates, and during the 
protracted litigation previously described, the head of the SEC, 
John Shad, and the head of the CFTC, Philip Johnson, agreed 
to settle their jurisdictional dispute with regard to the certifi-
cates107 and adopted the Shad/Johnson Accord108 (Accord). 
Under the Accord, the two agencies divided jurisdiction over 
options, with the SEC obtaining regulatory authority over 
options on securities, including those generally exempted from 
federal securities laws, 109 and "jurisdiction over options on 
groups or indexes of securities and options on foreign currency 
103. Id. at 1138. 
104. Id. at 1146. 
105. Judge Cudahy stated that "the majority fails at almost every tum to meet the 
tests of plain language, congressional intent, historical context and practical result. n Id. 
at 1168 (Cudahy J., dissenting). He further noted that, in the Accord, the SEC and the 
CFTC 
have now resolved their differences in a way which is consistent with almost any 
decision by us except the strained conclusion of the majority .... Not only have 
we done our best to frustrate the efforts of the concerned regulatory agencies ... 
but we have managed to conclude that an agency of long experience and high 
reputation must fully abandon its field of expertise in favor of a new and relative-
ly untested regulatory body of uncertain prospects. 
Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted). 
106. See infra Part 11.C. 
107. See CFTC and SEC Jurisdictumal Agreement: Proposed Legislation, [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982). 
108. See KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15. 
109. See Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAW. 67, 73 (1983). GNMA certificates and 
certificates of deposit are examples of securities generally exempted from federal 
securities laws. Id. 
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traded on securities exchanges."110 The CFTC obtained jurisdic-
tion over futures contracts on exempted securities and groups 
of securities or indexes, over options on futures contracts for 
such indexes, and over options on foreign currency traded on 
commodity exchanges.111 In addition, the Accord prohibited 
trading of futures contracts and options on futures contracts on 
individual corporate and municipal securities.112 Thus, the 
CFTC ultimately was free to authorize futures contracts, option 
contracts on commodities, and currencies, but could not autho-
rize options or futures contracts on equity securities. 113 · 
Despite the questionable power of the two agencies to divide 
up jurisdictional authority, 114 Congress ratified the Accord with 
only minor changes.115 As later developments demonstrated, 116 
the Accord "addressed a symptom rather than the problem," as 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. Coffee, supra note 8, at 462 (noting that the CFTC still could authorize futures 
on securities indexes); see also infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing 
the 1984 compromise between the CFTC and the SEC regarding limits on the CFTC's 
ability to trade stock index futures). 
114. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.8 (7th Cir.) (stating that 
"[w]e cannot allow the CFTC and SEC to reapportion their jurisdictions in the face of 
a clear, contrary statutory mandate"), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); Coffee, 
supra note 8, at 462. 
115. Coffee, supra note 8, at 462. In 1982, the CEA was amended to reflect the 
Accord. Horwitz & Markham, supra note 109, at 76. The Accord provides for the 
following: 
(i) ... [T]he [CFTC] shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as 
a contract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction 
acquires any put, call, or other option on one or more securities ... including any 
group or index of such securities, or any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof. 
(ii) ... [T]he Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to ac-
counts ... for future delivery of a group or index of securities .... 
(iv)(I) The Commission shall consult with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission with respect to any application ... for designation as a contract market 
with respect to any contract of sale (or option on such contract) for future delivery 
of a group or index of securities. 
7 U.S.C. § 2a (1994). 
116. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 agreement 
between the CFTC and the SEC); infra Part 11.D (discussing developments which 
occurred after the stock market crash of 1987). 
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options are but one among many financial instruments having 
attributes of both securities and futures contracts.117 
The Accord also was not the final word on stock index fu-
tures contracts. Under the Accord, the CFTC was restricted in 
the types or composition of the stock indexes "on which it could 
permit futures contracts to be traded."118 The Accord, however, 
contained the "Substantial Segment Criterion," which prevent-
ed trading in certain subindexes "that [amounted] to only a 
thinly-disguised 'surrogate' for trading in individual stocks."119 
Given the disparate interests of the two agencies, conflict 
was inevitable. In 1984, the CFTC approved a proposal for a 
subindex futures contract of the CME.120 Avoiding further 
litigation, the two agencies reached a compromise, agreeing to 
a set of five minimum criteria for "applications by boards of 
trade [i.e. futures exchanges] for designation as a contract 
market for futures contracts on a non-diversified stock in-
dex."121 The criteria are: (1) an index must contain at least 
twenty-five domestic securities; (2) the aggregate capitalization 
of the securities must be at least seventy-five billion dollars; (3) 
no single security can represent more than twenty-five percent 
of the index's aggregate capitalization; (4) no three securities 
can account for more than forty-five percent of the index; and 
(5) special rules must be applied to link weights to firm capital-
ization for noncapitalization weighted indexes.122 
While the agencies may have thought that this compromise 
would avert potentially extensive litigation, the compromise 
criteria were not well-received by the CFTC's clientele. Follow-
ing the agreement, the CBOT sued the two agencies over both 
117. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989). Given the 
hybrid nature of options, the 1980-1982 dispute over options could be played out with 
every new financial instrument. Id. 
118. Coffee, supra note 8, at 463. 
119. Id. The CFTC amendment to the CEA states that "[s]uch group or index of 
securities shall be ... a widely published measure of, and shall reflect, the market for 
all publicly traded equity or debt securities, or a substantial segment thereof" 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2a(ii)(III) (1994) (emphasis added). 
120. Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional 
Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC and Other Agencies, 4 J. FuTuru:s MARKETS 
267, 375 (1984). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 379-80; see Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on 
Futures Contracts Involving Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issues, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 2884 (1984); Coffee, supra note 8, at 464. Noting the cost in terms of lost competi-
tion abroad, Professor Coffee has stated that "[f]oreign futures exchanges have begun 
to trade futures on individual stocks, thus underscoring the cost of the SEC's 'substan-
tial segment' criterion." Id. at 466. 
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the substance of the new agreement and the informal adminis-
trative procedures the agencies followed in promulgating the 
agreement.123 
Thus, the Accord and the 1984 compromise, while represent-
ing positive steps in cooperation between the two agencies, 
were the result of a jurisdictional dispute that promises to 
continue unless more substantive action is taken. The Accord 
is problematic because although it put an end to the costly 
delay in permitting the trading of GNMA options, it also pro-
hibited any futures trading on individual equities. This action 
did not eliminate such trading but merely moved it overseas. 
Furthermore, the Accord, while attempting to resolve the 
issues surrounding stock index futures, failed to do so to the 
satisfaction of the SEC. This failure has further restricted 
financial innovation because it has resulted in questionable 
interagency collusion, such as the 1984 compromise, and 
threats of more litigation by the regulatory clients themselves. 
D. The 1987 Crash, the Index Participation 
Dispute, and the Future 
In the wake of the 1987 Crash, the SEC again petitioned 
Congress to obtain greater regulatory authority over financial 
markets, noting that the connections between all financial 
markets effectively create a single market requiring more 
concentrated regulatory authority.124 
123. Kane, supra note 120, at 375. The CFTC's clientele were upset because, they 
argued, "these criteria surrender stock index opportunities for futures exchanges that 
had been reserved in the 1982 legislation . . . . In effect, the CFTC's regulatory 
clientele is asking the courts to force the agency to protect its statutory turf." Id. For 
a more detailed description of the agency's battles over stock index futures, see id. at 
377-80. 
124. Coffee, supra note 8, at 460-63. SEC Chairman David S. Ruder asked Con-
gress to "transform the [SEC] into a regulatory superpower by vastly expanding its 
authority over the nation's stock, options and futures markets" and to transfer from the 
CFTC to the SEC authority to regulate stock index futures contracts. See David A. 
Vise, Chairman Urges Expanded SEC Role in Markets, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at Al. 
Ruder also voiced the commonly accepted opinion that the securities and futures 
markets really constitute a single market and stated that it was "inappropriate for the 
CFTC to have regulatory authority over stock index futures" due to their impact on the 
securities markets. Id. For a discussion of various exchange proposals in the aftermath 
of the 1987 Crash, see supra note 51. 
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In 1989, another jurisdictional dispute brought the issue of 
allocation of regulatory authority before the judges of the 
Seventh Circuit, this time in a debate over which agency 
should regulate index participations (IPs). 125 Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange v. SEC126 involved requests to trade IPs by the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), and the CBOE, all of which the SEC had granted in 
April 1989.127 
The court recognized several of the past resolutions concern-
ing financial instruments with mixed security-futures attrib-
utes, 128 and noted that the problem was that "the statute 
[7 U.S.C. § 2) does not define either 'contracts ... for future 
delivery' or 'option.' "129 The court stated that the subject would 
continue to plague the courts "[u]nless Congress changes the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the agencies. "130 After a 
lengthy review of the various factors comprising a "security" 
and a "futures contract," the court concluded that "[t]he only 
thing of which we are sure is that an IP is not an option on a 
security."131 The court noted that the case was merely an ana-
log to the 1982 litigation concerning GNMA options and appar-
ently was frustrated by the agencies' or Congress' inability to 
solve these persistent jurisdictional disputes. 132 
125. For a definition of "index participation," see supra note 75. 
126. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). 
127. Id. at 540--41. 
128. Id. at 539. If an instrument is both a security and a futures contract, the 
CFTC has jurisdiction, whereas if the instrument is both a futures contract and an 
option on a security, the SEC has jurisdiction. Id. 
129. Id. The opinion also indicated that the courts may not be the proper forum for 
solving such interagency jurisdictional disputes, noting that this case is merely another 
example of the circumstances giving rise to the 1982 litigation and the subsequent 
Accord, which would be played out in the future, as in this case, about each new 
financial instrument. See id. at 544. The court concluded that "[o]nly merger of the 
agencies or functional separation in the statute can avoid continual conflict." Id. 
130. Id. at 545. 
131. Id. at 546. The court noted the agencies' own confusion over the proper 
jurisdictional domain, stating: 
When we asked the SEC's Solicitor during oral argument whether the CFTC 
could have granted such an [IP] application [before the SEC], he said yes .... 
When we persisted with the question whether the CFTC could grant the identical 
application, filed by the CBOT and CME in 1989 (after the SEC's decision), the 
Solicitor said no .... Yet this principle of first-come-first-served finds no support 
in the '34 Act or the CEA. Either IPs are futures contracts or they aren't. 
Id. at 548. 
132. See id. at 549-50. 
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More recently, the question of whether particular hybrid 
instruments in the oil industry are forward or futures contracts 
was the subject of a judicial ruling in Transnor Ltd. v. BP 
North America Petroleum. 133 The court held in favor of CFTC 
jurisdiction, finding that 15-day Brent transactions134 constitut-
ed futures contracts.135 In response to the numerous inquiries 
that the CFTC received in response to this holding, former 
CFTC Chairwoman Wendy Gramm announced the agency's 
disagreement with the court's finding, stating that "the Com-
mission's Off-Exchange Staff Task Force has taken the view 
that the 15-day Brent contracts are not within the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction over futures contracts because they are 
within the category of transactions covered by the so-called 
forward contract exclusion of the Commodity Exchange Act."136 
Cases such as Chicago Mercantile and Transnor fail to recog-
nize the severely disruptive aftershocks in the affected markets 
and thus exemplify the inability of the judicial system to inter-
pret and categorize the jurisdiction of existing and developing 
hybrid instruments. Furthermore, placing the categorization of 
133. 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Transnor, the plaintiff purchased two 
cargos of North Sea Crude Oil in December 1985 for delivery in March 1986. Id. at 
1474. The plaintiff refused to take delivery of the oil because the oil's value had 
declined subsequent to entering into the contract. Id. 
134. A "15-day Brent" contract "refers to cargoes which were sold for delivery 
during a specific forward month, on 15-days notice to the buyer of the date on which 
the cargo should be lifted." Id. at 1485-86. The court struggled with the issue of 
whether a contract for purchase of oil for delivery from the Brent Oil fields in the 
North Sea was a forward contract, which is left undefined under the CEA, or a futures 
contract subject to CFTC jurisdiction. Id. at 1475, 1489. The particular contract in 
question was "a hybrid of a futures contract and a forward contract." Id. at 1489. 
Relying on prior judicial determinations that forward contracts are contracts "in which 
the commercial parties intend and can accommodate physical transfer of the actual 
commodity," and determining that no such intent existed between these parties, the 
court held that the contract involved was a futures contract. Id. at 1489, 1493. Thomas 
Russo has stated that "(i]fyou read the [Chicago Mercantile] decision together with the 
Transnor decision, it is very hard to imagine something out there that isn't the futures 
contract." Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 124. Russo criticized the holding, stating 
that "if the definition of a futures contract is so broad as to include any contract where 
there is any element of futurity, and the forward contract exclusion from the CEA is so 
narrow, then many markets that exist today are illegal." Id. at 131. 
135. 738 F. Supp. at 1493. 
136. Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 237. Although Transnor does not directly 
address the jurisdictional overlap between the SEC and the CFTC, it nonetheless 
reveals a significant definitional shortfall of the CEA and represents a broadening of 
CFTC jurisdiction through judicial action, a broadening which the CFTC itself argued 
was unwarranted. Id. Such a broad definition of a "futures contract" could result in 
further SEC/CFTC jurisdictional conflict as the agencies, the courts, and the markets 
struggle to adapt the dual and incomplete regulatory system to a wide range of hybrid 
financial instruments. 
SPRING 1995) Merger of the SEC and the CFTC 705 
new hybrid instruments in the hands of the courts leaves the 
agencies to fix the detrimental market effects, 137 and, as shown 
in Transnor, results in a disjuncture between the views of the 
agency and the judiciary. 
The main question posed by Transnor is whether the courts 
provide an appropriate forum for deciding issues of such magni-
tude, given the frustration of the courts in asserting responsi-
bility which they view as properly residing elsewhere.138 Such 
costly and protracted litigation raises other serious issues, such 
as negative impact on financial innovation, 139 loss of market 
share to foreign markets, 140 and inexpert results.141 One com-
mentator has stated that the CFTC's success in impeding the 
introduction of IPs through the SEC and the SEC's victory in 
barring non-diversified stock index futures are "dubious mile-
stones in the history of agency warfare. In the end, the capital 
markets would be freer ... if both agencies had lost."142 As the 
court noted in Chicago Mercantile, a merger of the two agencies 
would solve the jurisdictional battles. 
Indeed, several new, potentially explosive financial instru-
ments may soon create additional jurisdictional battles between 
the two agencies. While the SEC and the CFTC have, after two 
years, resolved the immediate threat to the agencies' fragile 
137. Thomas Russo noted the ambiguity of the phrase "contracts for future deliv-
ery" and the resulting potential problems: "[First,] it enables an exchange through 
litigation to prevent any new product from happening. The second thing it does ... as 
it is doing with the present oil market as we speak, it gets to disrupt existing mar-
kets." Id. at 124; see also id. at 258 (SEC Chairman Richard Breeden noting that 
current law permits a futures exchange to sue repeatedly to block new products, 
thereby further hampering competition and stifling innovation). 
138. See supra note 99. 
139. Professor Coffee, summing up the jurisdictional battles between 1980 and 
1989, stated that, 
[o]n one hand, the CFTC blocked the index participations that both the CBOE 
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange sought to trade, and, on the other, the SEC 
severely restricted non-diversified stock index futures. Neither side stands out as 
the villain or the hero in this story; rather, each side generated a regulatory 
penumbra around its core statutory jurisdiction within which it was able to bar 
firms regulated by the other from entering. 
Coffee, supra note 8, at 465-66. 
140. For example, before 1989, when the Seventh Circuit decided the IP issue in 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), the Toronto Stock 
Exchange was successfully trading an IP product. Philip M. Johnson, Refl.ections on the 
CFTC I SEC Jurisdictional Dispute, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
ISSUES AND POLICIES 145 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992). 
141. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
142. Coffee, supra note 8, at 481. 
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regulatory equilibrium posed by the Buy-write Option Unitary 
Derivatives (BOUNDS) instrument, 143 more threats are yet to 
come. According to one commentator, "[t]he dividing line be-
tween SEC and CFTC jurisdiction continues to blur, and some 
think it will fade completely. "144 The BOUNDS instrument, con-
taining elements of both a security and a futures contract, 
"highlights the problems inherent in adapting an innovative 
hybrid product to a creaking regulatory structure."145 Such 
problems cannot be remedied until Congress recognizes the 
tremendous practical and theoretical advantages of a single 
regulatory agency governing both the securities and futures 
markets. 
III. THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OVERLAP AND THE 
CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Just as the interagency jurisdictional conflict has resulted in 
several costly and inefficient battles, there are more fundamen-
tal, substantive problems inherent in a bifurcated regulatory 
system. These problems cannot be solved merely by tampering 
with the statutory language or by encouraging greater commu-
nication between the two agencies. 
A. Theoretical Consequences 
Supporters of the current dual regulatory system argue that 
the presence of two agencies supports a favorable competitive 
environment, results in less costly and imposing regulation, 
143. CBOE to Launch Index Options on Real Estate and Global Telecommunications 
Stocks, SEC. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1995, at 6 (noting that the CBOE has filed with the SEC 
to trade BOUNDS). A BOUNDS instrument operates as the equivalent of "simulta-
neously writing a call option and purchasing the underlying stock." Id. For more than 
two years, the CFTC and the SEC have debated the jurisdictional authority over this 
derivative product, with the CFTC recently deciding that BOUNDS are not futures 
contracts. Hal Lux, New Deriuatiue Product Rises from a Regulatory Graveyard: Two 
Years After Design, 'BOUNDS' May Start Trading, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Nov. 14, 
1994, at 4, 4. Exchanges now will seek permission to trade BOUNDS from the SEC. Id. 
144. Hal Lux, Forgotten but Not Gone: Now Into Its Second Year Without a Leader, 
the CFTC Risks Becoming Irrelevant, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Jan. 31, 1993, at 16, 19. 
145. See Lux, supra note 143, at 9. 
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and encourages financial innovation. According to Professor 
Coffee, the theory of regulatory competition146 rests on three 
pillars: (1) under certain assumptions, interjurisdictional com-
petition produces a Pareto-optimal outcome;147 (2) regulators, 
like corporate managers, seek to maximize the "value" of their 
agencies;148 and (3) regulators represent their market clien-
tele.149 However, as Professor Coffee notes, the regulatory 
competition theory breaks down when used to support the 
SEC-CFTC dual regulatory system.150 
Among the several theoretical problems with the current 
dual regulatory system are that it undermines public confi-
dence in our system of financial regulation, 151 subjects the 
CFTC to agency capture, 152 results in collusive, oligopolistic 
conditions, 153 and produces a "race-to-the-bottom," or "forum 
shopping" for the markets subject to the least stringent regu-
lation.154 
First, the dual regulatory system has a negative impact on 
the public's perception of market regulation. Former SEC 
Chairman Philip Johnson has suggested that the movement to 
146. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 453-57. For more discussion of regulatory 
competition, see Steven Kelman, The Ethics of Regulatory Competition, REG., 
May-June 1982, at 39, 39-44 (discussing environmental and other federal regula-
tions and the "race-to-the-bottom" argument of state and federal regulation); see also 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
23 (1983) (discussing the coexistence of federal and state regulatory systems in the 
context of antitrust regulation). 
147. Coffee, supra note 8, at 453 (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (discussing national versus local methods of 
allocating public expenditures and comparing public and private markets)). "Pareto-
optimality" generally refers to a condition in which no person can be made better off 
without maltlng another person worse off; thus a "Pareto superior" alternative is one 
which leaves at least one person better off and "no one worse off." DAVID W. BARNES & 
LYNN A STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (1992). Professor 
Coffee discounts this regulatory competition pillar, however, arguing in part that its 
assumptions of no externalities and single variable (least costly) analysis are unrealis-
tic. Coffee, supra note 8, at 453-54. 
148. Coffee, supra note 8, at 454. Professor Coffee dismisses this regulatory 
competition pillar on the ground that it ignores principal/agent problems. Id. 
149. Id. Professor Coffee argues that this third pillar of the regulatory competition 
model may lead to agency "capture." Id. 
150. Id. at 453-57. 
151. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 147-48; KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 18. 
152. Coffee, supra note 8, at 474-75; see also Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Agencies in 
Conflict: Overlapping Agencies and the Legitimacy of the Administrative Process, 33 
VAND. L. REV. 101, 109-12 (1980) (discussing generally capture and administrative 
legitimacy). 
153. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 471-72. 
154. See id. at 475-77; Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 202. 
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merge the two agencies is due in part to the public antagonism 
toward futures exchanges and the many scandals in the futures 
markets in the early years of the CFTC. 155 Thus, the existence 
of two regulatory agencies overseeing essentially a single 
market may undermine public confidence in market safety and 
increase the possibility of certain financial instruments slipping 
between the cracks and avoiding regulation.156 
While the public perception argument really only supports a 
transformation, or "tightening," of regulatory oversight, the 
agency capture argument lends stronger support to the idea of 
merging the SEC and the CFTC. The CFTC, newer and one-
fourth the size of the SEC, 157 is more prone to agency capture 
than the SEC.158 A member of the SEC's senior staff has stated 
that "the CFTC is [the futures markets'] regulator as well as 
the chamber of commerce and the promoter for the futures 
industry."159 Agency capture happens when smaller groups 
prevail at the expense of larger, less organized groups.160 In-
deed, the CFTC's frequent demonstrations of its political mus-
cle in many reauthorization hearings since 197 4 have revealed 
the desire of the CFTC and the futures markets it regulates to 
remain independent of the SEC.161 
Despite the significant costs of the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional 
conflict, Mary Schapiro, the Chairwoman of the CFTC, would 
likely support the cause of the "politically forceful Chicago 
futures markets" in actively resisting another round of merger 
or consolidation proposals.162 Given that the smaller the agency, 
the more likely it is that capture will occur, a larger agency, 
155. Johnson, supra note 140, at 147-48. 
156. See Breeden, supra note 60, at 316. 
157. The SEC, however, has more than three times the budget of the CFTC. 
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (Supp. V 1993) (SEC congressional authorization exceeded 
$178 million in fiscal year (FY) 1990 and $212 million in FY 1991) with 7 U.S.C. 
§ 16(d) (Supp. V 1993) (CFTC authorization was exactly $53 million in FY 1993 and 
$60 million in FY 1994). See also Taylor, supra note 52, at Cl (quoting the statement 
by CFTC Chairwoman Schapiro, in response to the Leach/Wyden merger bill, that 
"[t]here aren't any significant savings to be achieved by merging the agencies .... 
We're already a small agency with ... little administrative staff'). 
158. "Agency capture" occurs when a rent-seeking group, i.e., self-interested 
members of a particular constituency, tries to influence governmental processes to 
obtain gainful outcomes for the group. Coffee, supra note 8, at 35. 
159. See KllADEMIAN, supra note 15, at 155. 
160. Coffee, supra note 8, at 473-74. 
161. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 120, at 375. 
162. Taylor, supra note 52, at Cl. 
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such as the SEC or a merged SEC/CFTC agency with a broader 
jurisdictional scope, could more effectively prevent capture of 
the CFTC. . 
The theory of regulatory competition also fails to recognize 
that the existence of two regulatory agencies may result not in 
a competitive market but rather in an environment more closely 
resembling an oligopolistic market where the two agencies can 
easily collude and "cooperate" to achieve, as Professor Coffee 
states, "the quiet life."163 Given that the SEC and the CFTC are 
the only two agencies in the field, they can collude very easily 
and lawfully.164 In fact, when the agencies reach an agreement, 
others applaud their cooperation for being "statesmanlike," and 
both the courts and Congress tend to adopt the agencies' agree-
ment, 165 rather than subject the agreement to the scrutiny of 
antitrust laws that govern collusive activities in the private 
realm.166 
This state of oligopolistic "competition," which really pro-
duces no competition at all, compounds the negative impact of 
a dual regulatory system, because markets and consumers are 
subjected to the increased costs associated with the SEC-CFTC 
jurisdictional disputes167 and then further burdened by the 
accommodating solutions achieved between the two agencies. 168 
A competitive environment cannot be achieved in a regulatory 
system comprised of only two agencies. Merger of the agencies 
into a single regulatory body, while effectively creating a mon-
opoly over financial regulation, would not produce the negative 
impact and deadweight losses associated with monopolies in 
163. Coffee, supra note 8, at 472. 
164. See, e.g., supra Part 11.C (discussing the Shad/Johnson Accord of 1982, later 
adopted by Congress, in which the two agencies mutually agreed to settle a number of 
interagency jurisdictional disputes). 
165. Coffee, supra note 8, at 471. Professor Coffee further notes: 
In reality, the actual environment in which administrative agencies function 
resembles not the atomistic market of perfect competition but a heavily con-
centrated industry in which there are usually no more than two dominant firms. 
In such an environment, absent strict enforcement, oligopoly is highly likely in the 
private sector, and even more predictable in the public sector, where there is no 
legal barrier to such "cooperation. n 
Id. at 472. 
166. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). 
167. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra Part 11.C-D. 
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the private sector, because the benefits of a single regulatory 
monopoly accrues to the public. The benefits may include the 
elimination of costly court battles attempting to define inter-
agency jurisdictional boundaries, a corresponding increase in 
financial innovation as new instruments either are permitted 
to enter or are banned from the market more rapidly, and a 
single regulatory voice representing American markets in the 
global environment. 169 
Finally, another problem of a dual regulatory environment is 
the "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, in which interagency compe-
tition, to the extent that it does exist, results in sub-optimal 
regulation as agencies seek to attract clients by lowering regu-
latory standards.170 Under this scenario, when one market or 
regulator has achieved an "optimal" level of regulation, its 
competitor will lower its regulatory standards, thereby attract-
ing the mobile population while externalizing the harms of the 
sub-optimal regulation onto the other market regulator. 171 In 
response, the first regulator will lower its own standards, and 
a downward spiral ensues.172 
In the context of the SEC and the CFTC, the breakdown over 
clear interagency jurisdictional boundaries renders the finan-
cial markets vulnerable to intentional abuses of the regulatory 
gaps. A market actor "presented with a choice between either 
of two functionally similar markets· ... will seek the market 
representing the 'lowest common denominator' of regulation. "173 
Thus, under the current regulatory regime, there is the poten-
tial for "forum shopping" and a sub-optimal level of regula-
tion.174 To the extent that the race-to-the-bottom scenario 
creates inefficient and sub-optimal regulation in financial 
169. Although a single regulatory authority might better oversee the financial 
markets, avoid or limit agency capture, and enhance the efficient workings of the 
market, such gains initially could be offset by internal wars between SEC and former 
CFTC personnel and by the practical impact of merging two separate bureaucratic 
cultures. 
170. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 475. 
171. See id. at 476-77. 
172. Id. 
173. Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 190. 
17 4. For a further discussion of the "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, see Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implemen-
tation of Nati-Onal Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (commenting 
that "any individual state . . . may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high 
environmental standards that entail substantial costs ... for fear that the resulting 
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas 
with lower standards"). 
SPRING 1995) Merger of the SEC and the CFTC · 711 
markets, consolidation of regulatory authority into a single 
agency could solve the problem.175 
One example of the race-to-the-bottom scenario in the SEC-
CFTC jurisdictional conflict is the CFTC's unwillingness, even 
since the 1987 Crash, to increase margin requirements to bring 
them in-line with the requirements that the Federal Reserve 
currently imposes on securities markets. 176 Differing margin 
requirements in the securities and futures markets arguably 
undermine the safety and stability of the markets. 177 With the 
ever increasing number of hybrid instruments in the financial 
markets, the two agencies will undoubtedly continue to assert 
conflicting jurisdiction over such instruments, thereby encour-
aging this destructive scenario. 
B. Current Political Environment 
The new Republican majority could have a substantial im-
pact in favor of the consolidation of regulatory authority in a 
single agency. Recently, congressional oversight committees 
have posed an obstacle to any change in the financial regula-
tory structure, because such committees are extremely reluc-
tant to relinquish any authority over the agencies that they 
oversee.178 The House Agriculture Committee has refused to 
175. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competitwn: Rethinking the 'Race-
to-the·Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N. Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
1210 (1992). 
176. See Gene Ramos, SEC, CFTC Chiefs Differ on Bill Seeking to Merge Two 
Agencies, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT 
File (discussing the recent Leach/Wyden bill and its proposal to consolidate the margin-
setting function into a single regulatory agency). 
177. See Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 255. Former SEC Chairman Richard 
Breeden has stated that 
[a) low margin encourages speculative trading . . . creat[ing the) illusion of 
liquidity in the stock index futures markets. When market conditions become 
extreme, however, these highly leveraged traders withdraw from the market and 
the mirage of liquidity disappears almost instantly. When that happens, prices 
fall rapidly in the futures markets. Those price declines are then transmitted to 
the stock market through index arbitrage. 
Id. at 253. 
178. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 447-48. The House and Senate Agriculture 
Committees have jurisdiction over the CFTC, while the Senate Banking Committee 
and the House Energy and Commerce Committee oversee the SEC. See Nathaniel C. 
Nash, The Battle Over Regulatwn of the Futures Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, 
at Cl2. 
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give up its power over the CFTC, and the commodity futures 
industry has been opposed to SEC oversight because the indus-
try believes that the SEC is insensitive to its needs. 179 Repub-
licans, however, generally have been strong proponents of some 
type of merger or regulatory reform proposal, 180 and their 
congressional majority could significantly aid an interagency 
merger. For example, in the first weeks of the new congressio-
nal session, Representatives Jim Leach (R-IA) and Ron Wyden 
(D-OR) introduced a bill, HR 718, that would effectively merge 
the SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory agency to be 
called the "Markets and Trading Commission. "181 
Furthermore, support from key Democrats also may aid an 
interagency merger. Dan Glickman, a former Democratic mem-
ber of the House of Representatives from Kansas who served 
on the House Agricultural Committee and is currently the 
Secretary of Agriculture, 182 has previously introduced legisla-
tion to merge the SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory 
agency. 183 The new Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, also has 
voiced support for a merger proposal.184 
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The possibility of regulatory reform of the financial markets 
does seem to exist, perhaps for the first time since the creation 
of the CFTC. In early 1995, members of both parties in Con-
gress introduced various pieces of legislation aimed at reform-
ing the financial markets in general and the securities and 
futures markets in particular.185 Glickman and Wyden together 
recently co-sponsored several bills aimed at merging the two 
agencies, demonstrating potential bipartisan support for such 
a measure.186 
In the past, biennial reauthorization hearings have provided 
a forum for raising jurisdictional issues and arguing for 
increased SEC regulatory authority. Such hearings were 
scheduled to take place in May 1994, 187 but have been delayed 
indefinitely.188 Given both that the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee unanimously approved a bill on February 1, 1995, to 
renew . the CFTC for five years, its longest reauthorization 
period ever,189 and that no reauthorization hearings are 
presently scheduled, the Leach/Wyden bill and other legisla-
tive proposals may provide a more expedient route to change. 
CONCLUSION 
The current system of financial regulation of the securities 
and futures markets is untenable in a world of complex fi-
nancial instruments and global markets. New instruments 
which defy categorical definition are frequently created, and 
the current jurisdictional quagmire will continue to stifle 
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innovation and increase costs as the agencies attempt but fai] 
to resolve jurisdictional problems that merit a more substantive 
solution. Congress' past attempts to alleviate the jurisdictional 
disputes, through amendments to the CEA and by requiring 
the agencies to maintain communications and cooperate, have 
failed to solve the fundamental problems posed by hybrid 
instruments which cannot be classified as either "securities" or 
"futures contracts." 
In addition, the courts are uncomfortable in their role as inter-
agency referees and consider themselves ill-suited for resolving 
such complex financial disputes. Indeed, on the issue of jurisdic-
tional authority over securities options, the Shad/Johnson 
Accord between the two agencies resulted in the exact opposite 
conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the 
same issue. Complex financial issues should not receive such 
arbitrary treatment. The solutions to the interagency jurisdic-
tional dispute should not be left to a well-meaning but admitted-
ly underqualified judiciary. 
The problems which have plagued the agencies in the past 
promise to repeat themselves in an unending cycle. For the 
benefit of domestic financial markets and in the interest of the 
general public, the SEC and the CFTC should merge into a 
single regulatory agency, thereby eliminating costly jurisdiction-
al disputes and restoring the international competitiveness of 
domestic markets. 
